Easier to get stories? Yes. Easier to achieve meaningful results with the public? No.

I was reminded of this question by the recent expulsion of hard-charging Al Jazeera English correspondent Melissa Chan, and subsequent closure of the AJE bureau in China after the Ministry of Foreign Affairs refused to accredit another AJE journalist. I didn’t know Melissa well, though I had met her, but I respected her reporting and willingness to insert herself into uncomfortable situations, and I was disappointed to see her go. Reporting on China will be impoverished a bit.

That, of course, was the point. The Chinese government has never been comfortable with an adversarial media, and Melissa’s reporting was, like that of much of the foreign press corps, pretty adversarial from their point of view. This discomfort is deeper than cursory annoyance at embarrassing foreign gadflies (although I presume that is part of it). It arises from one of the fundamental philosophies of Leninist political parties: the media are considered Party organs and, as with other Party organs, expected to serve the interests of the Party first and foremost. Media that don’t fit into that model are suspect by definition. You can see this philosophy expressed in the mechanisms of control that the Chinese government maintains over all domestic media, and in the government’s struggles to come to terms with the rise of social media that resist conformity with established power structures.

Read the rest at Rectified.name.

Deep sigh.

Anyway, Instagram is freely accessible here in China, at least for the moment, and apparently has a small but growing user base. It’s been limited to a certain slice of the China market by being an iOS-only app until last week. It may get picked up more now that it’s on Android as well, especially given Android’s whomping share of the smartphone market in China.

Because Instagram is accessible from China there has been some speculation that it might provide a back-door into the market for Facebook. Well, color me embarrassed, because when I looked at how Facebook might get into China a couple of weeks ago, one scenario I didn’t explore was Facebook buying another, unblocked western social network.

Instagram certainly functions as a posting back-door to both Facebook and Twitter. Instagram posts route to Facebook, Twitter and other social networks through Instagram’s unblocked servers (actually, Amazon’s cloud servers for the moment). There are similar middleman workarounds for posting on blocked social networks, such as Ping.fm, but none come close to providing full access to Twitter or Facebook. And, from what I can see, neither does Instagram. That’s important.

Read the rest at Rectified.name.

Despite all of that, leave to our friends at the excellent Tech in Asia blog to have the most sensible take, “Zuckerberg is in China…Who cares?” Indeed.

Obviously, we don’t know a thing about Facebook’s designs on China. But to make sense of the speculation it’s helpful to consider the actual scenarios by which Facebook or Twitter or indeed any foreign social network might enter China, and to look at how different stakeholder groups will react to the possible scenarios. This is different than analyzing business strategy or financial implications, but ultimately it’s all connected.

Read the rest and see the handy chart at Rectified.name.

The show was hosted by Sinica impresario Kaiser Kuo and rounded out by usual suspects Jeremy Goldkorn, Charlie Custer, Mary Kay Magistad and yours truly. The show page is here and the direct MP3 download is here. You can also subscribe on iTunes by searching Sinica or Popup Chinese. Enjoy.

Not as painful as Sedaris' essay.

But stick with me, because that’s the point. The fact is that everyone and their goldfish has an opinion on Google’s fortunes in China, but few people actually know anything conclusive, so what we’re getting is a huge dose of punditry, analysis and opinioneering. This is the kind of thing that PR people live for, because what we’re witnessing first hand is the creation of a narrative. Or, rather, several narratives that serve different worldviews, audiences and points of view.

This is PR in action: The effort to influence perception and opinion with regard to an entity or event, generally with the objective of supporting some kind of end-state result (higher sales, a political victory, popular consensus, the launch of a war, etc.).

PR people are often accused of being liars. This is a shame, because a good PR person doesn’t lie or make up facts. I’d like to tell you this is because PR people are noble souls who want only the best for the planet and fuzzy puppies, but the real reason is that lying makes you vulnerable and doesn’t usually work very well (and, yes, it’s also wrong). Lies can often be proved false, and this can cause your position to unravel pretty quickly, often with devastating consequences. Even if you string the lie out long enough to achieve a stated objective, you’ll take damage on the backside if your story comes apart. See, for example, weapons of mass destruction and the Iraq war, which claimed the reputations and legacies of many people.

But PR people do often try to interpret the facts (or obscure them) in specific in selective ways. In the vernacular, we spin things. In fact, the very term “spin doctor” (sometimes credited to the novelist, Saul Bellow) refers to trying to define the interpretation of events or facts — to determine which way they “spin” in the public sphere.

PR people do this for a living. But we’re not the only ones who do it. Anyone with an agenda tries to interpret facts to create a narrative that serves that agenda, or that serves their world view. Often, dueling parties compete to establish the defining narrative of a situation or event. Consider how Democrats and Republicans competed to establish the narrative for health care reform in the interest of divergent political objectives. The media and public spheres of discussion are thus, often, noisy and squawky collections of competing narratives interpreted or distorted from the same basic set of facts in order to serve different agendas. Sometimes it takes a long time for a “definitive” narrative to emerge. Sometimes a definitive narrative never emerges, or different audiences arrive at divergent narratives because they’re exposed to different influences (anyone who looks at how Chinese and Western audiences fail to see eye-to-eye on many issues will be familiar with this).

This is essentially what has been happening with Google over the past few weeks, as people have competed to establish different narratives regarding its withdrawal from China. There has been a huge amount written and said about Google’s predicament and options in both the Chinese and Western media and blogospheres. At last count I had 27 articles bookmarked since the announcement that Google would shift it’s Chinese search operation to Hong Kong. And there were plenty that I didn’t bother to bookmark.

Well, that’s just too much damned stuff to analyze, and I am way too lazy to pore through it with a notebook and try to draw any meaningful conclusions about what it all means (hey, I don’t get paid for this). Also, my overwhelming impression is that there is so far roughly zero consensus on what it all means.

What I did do, however, was to put together a handy chart that shows the key known facts, and, based upon all the articles I’ve read, how each of the major interest groups that I observe is spinning or reacting to each of those facts. In each case, the vertical thread through the series of facts creates the skeleton of a narrative. And that’s what each of these parties –Google, its rivals, the Chinese government, the Western activist community– is trying to do: They’re each trying to control and define the narrative of Google’s situation in China to serve their own agendas. They are, in other words spinning. Here is what the result looks like:

I realize this is a vast oversimplification and there are no doubt various interests omitted, but this captures most of the main parties and facts. What’s not included here is any kind of conclusion of each narrative. In my opinion, the story is still unfolding and its too early for that. But we’ll see how things go over the next few weeks.

The other thing is that these narratives aren’t in equal competition. To use a possibly inappropriate military metaphor, there are different theaters of operation in which the stakeholder have varying levels of influence. So, in the US, Google and the activist (and analyst) community are the loudest voices. in China, the Chinese government has the tools to define the public narrative, and has been using them liberally, although there is some ferment in the margins (also here).

Eventually, there will be a canonical version of Google’s misadventures in China. or at least one canonical version in the West and one in China. These may not be the creation of a single group. One group might control interpretation of one element of the story, and one group control another. But for the moment, the fun is in watching the battle to own the story. Enjoy it while it lasts.

Finally, from a PR perspective, there is possibly one overarching lesson that can be drawn from this whole situation. I can’t take credit for this insight, it comes from Craig Adams, a colleague of mine. But it’s deceptively straightforward and I agree with it wholeheartedly. He said that if you have to sell out your basic principles to do business in China, that’s a pretty good sign you should reconsider your plans.

Other sources (just to prove I’ve done my homework):

• Official Google Blog: A new approach to China: an update
• After China Move, Google Faces the Fallout – NYTimes.com
• Rio Tinto Is and Google Refused To Be, Corrupt, Rule of Law in China (Asian Healthcare Blog)
• G-Day: Letter from China : The New Yorker
• Billionaire linked to Rio Tinto bribe case | Stuff.co.nz
• FT.com / China – Redirection of users ‘just a little trick’
• RConversation: China, the Internet and Google: my uninvited testimony
• An Interview with David Drummond of Google – Science and Tech – The Atlantic
• Google Braces for Fallout in China – WSJ.com
• Stance by China to Limit Google Is Risk by Beijing – NYTimes.com
• Silicon Hutong: The Google Shuffle and the Hong Kong Twist
• China Kowtows To Nobody, Especially Google – Forbes.com
• Stance by China to Limit Google Is Risk by Beijing – NYTimes.com
• Google’s China Site Redirect Was Pretty Clever, Actually (Silicon Alley Insider)
• Google’s unwise move to Hong Kong – How the World Works – Salon.com
• Letter from China: Life Without Google : The New Yorker
• Brin Drove Google to Pull Back in China – WSJ.com
• Google Searches for a Foreign Policy – NYTimes.com
• Three Google / China Follow-Ups – Science and Tech – The Atlantic
• China Unicom Dumps Google from Android | John Paczkowski | Digital Daily | AllThingsD
• China says Google breaks promise, totally wrong to stop censoring (Xinhua)
• Google Would Remind My Grandpa of the Arrogant White Invaders – China – Gizmodo
• Heard on the Street: On Rio Tinto and Google in China – WSJ.com
• Google Official Calls for Action on Internet Restrictions – NYTimes.com
• How China’s internet generation broke the silence | World news | The Guardian
• Goodbye Google and GM information (China Daily)

Previously:

Google detonates the China corporate communications script (January, 2010)

Note: Table slightly updated to correct “mainland” to “Greater China”.

Filtering is the primary means of censoring content over which an authority has no jurisdiction. When it comes to websites and Internet services over which a government does have legal jurisdiction – usually because at least some of the company’s operations and computer servers are located in-country – why merely block or filter content when you can delete it from the Internet entirely? The technical means for deleting content, or preventing its publication or transmission in the first place, vary depending on the country and situation. The legal mechanism, however, is essentially the same everywhere. In Anglo-European legal systems we call it “intermediary liability.” The Chinese government calls it “self-discipline,” but it amounts to the same thing, and it is precisely the legal mechanism through which Google’s Chinese search engine, Google.cn, was required to censor its search results. All Internet companies operating within Chinese jurisdiction – domestic or foreign – are held liable for everything appearing on their search engines, blogging platforms, and social networking services. They are also legally responsible for everything their users discuss or organize through chat clients and messaging services. In this way, much of the censorship and surveillance work in China is delegated and outsourced by the government to the private sector – who, if they fail to censor and monitor their users to the government’s satisfaction, will lose their business license and be forced to shut down. It is also the mechanism through which China-based companies must monitor and censor the conversations of more than fifty million Chinese bloggers. Politically sensitive conversations are deleted or blocked from being published at all. Bloggers who get too influential in the wrong ways can have their accounts shut down and their entire blogs erased. That work is done primarily not by “Internet police” but by employees of Internet companies.

Rebecca’s footnotes for this paragraph, which are worthwhile, are here. Numbers 6 and 7.

I thought this was worthwhile because there is a great deal of attention paid to the technological aspects of censorship in the US, partly because American companies have had some complicity in it, and partly because it’s simply an interesting technology story. But the self-censorship and regulatory side is has an much more significant effect on the content that most Chinese Internet users are really interested in.

On this topic it’s also well worth reading a February 23rd post from the always excellent China Media Project on the licensing of journalists by the General Administration of Press and Publication, and how that is used as a tool of information control:

We can say metaphorically that four documents are used to control media in mainland China. The first is the “birth certificate,” or chusheng zheng (出生证), which means that the state controls which publications can and cannot be issued with publishing licenses, or kanhao (刊号). The second is the press card, or jizhe zheng (记者证), which determines who does and who does not have the credentials to practice journalism. Next comes the “certificate of appointment,” or weiren zhuang (委任状), which controls appointments of top officials inside media outfits. Finally, there is the “death certificate,” or siwang zheng (死亡证), meaning that the CCP can choose at any time to shut down or otherwise discipline media that do not fall in line.

And, of course, the surprisingly fascinating article on online censorship that ran in the Global Times last week, and which I commented on here.

See also:

Stan Abrams at China Hearsay with a fisk-o-rama of the Financial Times’ coverage of Google’s portion of the hearing.

Speaking of photo-essays on bikini girls, Imagethief was surprised to find a very interesting article on online censorship in China in the English edition of the Global Times. I mention bikini girls here (for the third time, you’ll notice) not just to boost my search returns, although that will be a side benefit, but because at the foot of every page of this article was a link to a photo feature on “Sexy and Hot Philippine Beauties” provided by, yes, Xinhua. QED. The spread is here, if you must. Too much makeup for my taste, but, hey, to each their own.

If you’ve had your moment with the…alright, a fourth insertion would be gratuitous…the Global Times article is interesting for a couple of reasons. First, the source. The Chinese version of the Global Times is a fiery and thoroughly patriotic tabloid companion to the correct but turgid People’s Daily. The English version, launched last year, is among the slickest of the English language newspapers in China, and is a bit less flag waving than its Chinese companion. But it’s still a Party publication. The second surprise is the unexpected depth of the story and the conspicuous absence of the official point of view, which is heavy on the primacy of maintaining social harmony and purifying the Internet. The focus of the article is on the costs of censorship to regular net users and entrepreneurs.

The Global Times hedges its bets a bit, with the entire first page focusing on the censorship applied by popular forum Douban, but dig a bit deeper into the story and it gets to the heart of how the Chinese government censors websites. It is not, as many people think, primarily technological, but rather a complex system of rules that are so vague and inconsistently applied that Chinese websites self-censor ruthlessly rather than risk joining the growing list of sites shut down as object lessons:

What’s worse [than waiting for the call from the autorities, said website operator Zoe Wang] was the complete absence of clear-cut rules for deciding whether or not to delete an online post.

“The criterion of sensitivity depends on many aspects such as the political environment, the website’s background, size and location, as well as the different understandings of Web masters.”

Douban was extraordinarily cautious about its content as it had no background or ties to government, according to a source close to an editor at the site.

“Once you’re shut down, nobody can save you,” the source said.

No editor from Douban would go on the record when the Global Times contacted them.

“Douban recalls clearly the fate of Fanfou, Yeeyan and Blogbus,” Fang said.

They were three of the most well-known mainland websites closed down last year, according to the Southern Metropolis Weekly. The latter two were recovered in January.

Fanfou founder Wang Xing was pondering how much to up censorship during the July 5 Xinjiang riot last year when he got his answer.

The Twitter-style microblogging service for 100,000 registered users was closed down almost immediately for “violating related rules”, according to the China Business News Weekly.

Wang hasn’t given up hope of bringing Fanfou back some day. Seven months on, Wang still refused to comment.

It’s well worth reading the whole thing, and, considering the source, a welcome compliment to the western media’s tendency to focus on the (admittedly important) technological aspects of Internet censorship in China, and the heavily mythologized 30,000 Internet police.  As secret police forces through the years have known, uncertainty and paranoia are very powerful and very simple tools for keeping people in line.

See also:

• China Real Time Report: Report looks at China’s online censorship
• Digicha: “Publish and be deleted” – The Global Times on censorship in China

Previously:

• What to make of Edwin Maher? (December, 2007 – Opens on the old Imagethief blog)

A quick pointer to an excellent post at the Wall Street Journal’s China Real Time blog, which busts several myths concerning Google in China that have been widely repeated in the past few days, including those concerning the health of Google’s business in China, whether or not they already uncensored search results here, and more. From Beijing-based correspondent Sky Canaves (@skycita), showing once again that, if you want to know what’s going on in China, talk to someone who’s here.

The first half of the post discusses alleged hacking attempts on Google, apparently with the aims of both recovering Google source code and accessing the Gmail accounts of dissidents. But the second half of the post is more interesting. The money grafs below (emphasis mine):

We launched Google.cn in January 2006 in the belief that the benefits of increased access to information for people in China and a more open Internet outweighed our discomfort in agreeing to censor some results. At the time we made clear that “we will carefully monitor conditions in China, including new laws and other restrictions on our services. If we determine that we are unable to achieve the objectives outlined we will not hesitate to reconsider our approach to China.”

These attacks and the surveillance they have uncovered–combined with the attempts over the past year to further limit free speech on the web–have led us to conclude that we should review the feasibility of our business operations in China. We have decided we are no longer willing to continue censoring our results on Google.cn, and so over the next few weeks we will be discussing with the Chinese government the basis on which we could operate an unfiltered search engine within the law, if at all. We recognize that this may well mean having to shut down Google.cn, and potentially our offices in China.

No doubt a great deal has transpired behind the scenes in the lead up to this announcement. To save time, here’s what I don’t know:

• Whether this is linked to rumors of Google’s possible withdrawal from China and staff exodus that circulated several weeks ago.
• The relative weights of the hacking issue, censorship issue and Google’s business struggles in China in leading the company to make this statement.
• What, if any, discussions Google had with Chinese authorities prior to making this statement (they speak of discussions “over the next few weeks”), or whether there are actually continuing negotiations.
• Whether recent blocks of Google Docs and Google Groups in China contributed to this decision.
• Whether Google would have done this if their business in China was stronger. China contributes a minuscule portion of Google’s revenue.
• What will actually happen to Google’s business in China in the long run.

Here is what I do know:

Google has taken the China corporate communications playbook, wrapped it in oily rags, doused it in gasoline and dropped a lit match on it. In China, foreign companies tend to be deferential to the authorities to the point of obsequiousness, in a way that you would almost certainly never encounter in the United States or Europe. Scan any foreign company’s China press releases and count the number of times you see the phrase, “commitment to China”. Demonstrating “alignment with the Chinese government’s agenda” is an accepted tenet of corporate positioning and corporate social responsibility work in China. This is testament to the degree of direct power that the Chinese authorities wield over the fortunes of foreign businesses in China. Even when foreign companies are in dispute with the Chinese government they tend to offer criticism obliquely as long as they have a business stake or operations in the country. Note, for example, the scrupulous diplomacy of Rio Tinto’s communications concerning the detention of its employees last summer, a far more serious situation than anything Google has encountered (although also with far more money at stake).

In this situation Google has undertaken a bet-the-farm confrontational communications approach in China. They will not have made this decision lightly. Dressed up in the polite language above is what is essentially an ultimatum: Allow us to present uncensored search results to our Chinese users or we’ll walk. The Chinese government is not likely to cave to an ultimatum from a foreign company, no matter how decorously delivered. As Richard Waters of the FT has pointed out, the language does leave some wiggle room for further negotiation. However, Imagethief cannot imagine a circumstance in which the Chinese government will give Google free reign, especially in the current, highly restrictive climate for Internet services. Barring some surprising developments, the clock would therefore appear to be ticking for Google.cn, if not Google’s overall operations in China. It will be very interesting to see how this plays out.

Would Google continue with an office in China if there was no Google.cn site? They could still conduct R&D here, for instance. But Google’s R&D operations in China have been troubled (remember the Sogou IME scandal?) and if the security issues are taken at face value continuing operations here in the absence of a local business to support might simply be extra risk. Consider how many China R&D operations are “PR&D”, designed to demonstrate that essential “commitment to China” in support of a revenue-generating business in China. It’s not that real R&D doesn’t happen here, but how many companies do high-level, primary R&D in China in the absence of an on-shore business and supporting government relations program? And could Google attract talent to a pariah operation? Distraught Chinese netizens are already laying flowers at Google’s China headquarters.

The Wall Street Journal’s story (sub) on the unfolding situation makes some interesting points (emphasis again mine):

The common assumption, however, is that no matter how onerous the limitations and challenges faced by foreign companies in China, the market is too big and important to walk away from.

That calculation has forced a number of foreign firms to accept conditions in China that they might not tolerate elsewhere. The country has 338 million Internet users as of June, more than any other country.

Google would be the most high-profile Western company in recent years to draw a line under the kind of compromises it is prepared to make and walk away from China.

It would be an extremely rare case of a foreign company taking a stand on human rights, and placing that issue over commercial considerations. A number of foreign companies exited China after the Chinese army crushed student protesters around Tiananmen Square in 1989. But they mostly came back in the following years.

A Google withdrawal would also be an implicit rejection of the argument made by many technology companies that their presence in China overall helps expand access to information for Chinese citizens, despite censorship.

That’s the very last line in the story, but I found it one of the most interesting. If you followed the original justifications offered by many American Internet companies for launching businesses in China, or the congressional hearings on the matter in 2006, you will recall that the argument that even a censored presence in China improved access to information for Chinese Internet users was central. If Google repudiates that argument it will put pressure on other American Internet firms currently toeing the regulatory line in China, especially Microsoft, and weaken one of their core public arguments for a continued presence in China. Then again, it may also represent an opportunity for them. After all, “Google” doesn’t phoneticize well in Chinese, as the flap over the “谷歌” brand demonstrated. But “Bing” works quite nicely indeed.

This only the latest chapter –albeit potentially a critical one– in the very interesting story of Google in China. Someone needs to write the book. Anyone want to step forward for that?

See also:

• Rebecca MacKinnon’s roundup of responses.
• James Fallows’ analysis on how this development fits into a broader picture of increasingly tense economic relationships for China.
• Sarah Lacy in TechCrunch, citing tweets from both Bill Bishop (@niubi — now also blogging again at Digicha) and Marc van der Chijs (@chijs).
• Brief US State Department statement.
• CNBC interview with David Drummond (Video – also embedded below): “We’re not saying one way or the other whether the attacks were state sponsored…” Note also the silly use of the word, “cyberterrorists” by the interviewer.
• Brief, relatively straightforward report from the People’s Daily online (Chinese).
• Chinese telecoms analyst Xiang Ligang calls it “psychological warfare”, doesn’t think Google will pull the trigger, and doesn’t think it will be a cataclysm if they do (if I read it correctly – Chinese).

Updates:

• On the corporate communications aspect, this quote from Jonathan Zittrain of Harvard’s Berkman Center, in a Mercury News story (via Jeff Jarvis’ BuzzMachine):

“In a world in which we are so used to public relations massaging of messages, this stands out as a direct declaration. It’s amazing,” said Jonathan Zittrain, professor of Internet law at Harvard Law School and co-director of Harvard’s Berkman Center for Internet & Society.

• Jeremy Goldkorn (of Danwei) at the Guardian:

The fallout will be interesting. I can’t recall a single case of a major international company with operations in China taking a stand like this. As someone who agreed with Google’s reasoning when it entered China, I also support this move. If it cannot operate here in accordance with its global standards, it should leave. I have given up on getting my own website unblocked by the government and am resigned to the fact that it’s only accessible to people who are outside China or know the technical tricks to get over the Great Firewall.

I’d rather be outside the wall and free than inside it with the icy hand of the censor around my throat.

• Wired’s “Threat Level” blog on some of the considerations within Google (via @kaiserkuo).
• Full disclosure: Imagethief is a supporter of foreign Internet services operating in China. Elaboration in this comment, below, in response to a point from a reader.
• Isaac Mao’s open letter to Google (English), via Harvard’s “Difficult Problems in Cyberlaw” blog.
• Xinhua English report on the statement: “‘It is still hard to say whether Google will quit China or not. Nobody knows,’ the official said.”
• Gady Epstein’s column on Forbes.com: “Dreams of Internet openness in China appear to be a fantasy.” Indeed.
• Evgeny Morozov punctures the feelgood balloon at Foreign Policy: “If…you believe that [Google] did the right thing in China by offering their limited service (rather than no service at all), I don’t see how this move could make you feel good…”

Imagethief is as annoyed by the Great Firewall (or Net Nanny or what-have-you) as anyone who lives in China and uses overseas social networks. One of the great joys of my pox-afflicted Christmas vacation was having one of my annual bursts of unfettered Internet use. After months of sipping my Internet through the narrow and frequently blocked swizzle-stick of Chinese “broadband” it’s always refreshing to turn the VPN off and draw my Internet through the big-bore bubble tea straw of an American or Singaporean ISP.

Still, say what you will about the GFW, it does provide those of us who live in China with one of our most enduring parlor games: Who’s blocked? Why? Who goes down next? What’s accessible again? What does it all mean? Buy? Sell? Hold? Stockpile turnips? Trying to read the tea leaves of the GFW is the Kreminology of  21st Century Beijing, especially for us nerdy blogging types.

Most of the time, as misguided as it might appear to us bourgeois foreigners, we can at least discern the rationale for GFW decisions. Apple highlights an album dedicated to Tibet on iTunes, so they get slapped for a while. Yeeyan starts translating foreign news a little too freely so the great, sweaty thumb comes down on them like the Monty Python foot of censorship. Microblogs outside the control of the big media groups looking a little too much like group organizing tools? Adios, muchachos. Sorry about all those venture capital deals. In its own way, the GFW is a window into the fever dreams of the Chinese government, albeit a small window in serious need of a spritz of Windex and a roll of “Brawny” paper towls.

But I have to confess I am totally mystified as to why this week the Chinese authorities decided to block the Internet Movie Database (IMDb). Yes, there are most certainly entries in IMDb that are counter to Chinese doctrine (“Seven Years in Tibet”, etc.), but you’d struggle to find them through the updates on development of the sequel to “The Hangover” and such. All of that “hurt-the-feelings-of-the-Chinese-people” stuff is also available in more practical and influential form on any number of other sites such as iTunes, Google and Amazon.

If anyone has a good explanation for why this happened, I’d love to hear it. Is it personal? Perhaps it’s because a search for “Tiananmen” yields plenty of misguided Western propaganda while shamefully omitting China Film Corporation’s feel-good National Day picture of the same name*? Who knows. Simply by virtue of its impenetrability and apparent capriciousness, this move puts the GFW dangerously close to self-parody territory. What’s next to be blocked in the interest of the correct guidance of public opinion? Hello Kitty? ESPN? Funny-or-die? The mind reels.

*This was last year’s lightweight counterpart to the more serious but less watchable “Founding of a Republic.” Imagethief really wants to know what the deal with the girl with the accordion was. She’s on the poster foreground, but in the film for all of about ninety seconds, thus constituting the sum-total of the sex appeal as far as Imagethief is concerned. This, although scant, was admittedly ninety seconds more sex-appeal than “Founding of a Republic” had.

Update:

Also blocked, for the first time as far as I know, is Imagethief. Puts me in good company, along with Danwei.

Update 2:

Apparently blocked only in Beijing. Imagethief, it seems, is suitable for the decadent financiers of Pudong, but not for the refined sensibilities of Zhongnanhai. I don’t know what to think.

Think, "Die Hard", only communist, funnier and with an accordion girl.

.

We examined the Green Dam software and found that it contains serious security vulnerabilities due to programming errors. Once Green Dam is installed, any web site the user visits can exploit these problems to take control of the computer. This could allow malicious sites to steal private data, send spam, or enlist the computer in a botnet. In addition, we found vulnerabilities in the way Green Dam processes blacklist updates that could allow the software makers or others to install malicious code during the update process.

We found these problems with less than 12 hours of testing, and we believe they may be only the tip of the iceberg. Green Dam makes frequent use of unsafe and outdated programming practices that likely introduce numerous other vulnerabilities. Correcting these problems will require extensive changes to the software and careful retesting. In the meantime, we recommend that users protect themselves by uninstalling Green Dam immediately.

Judging from the livid reaction in China, no-one will have to work too hard to convince Chinese computer users to take that advice. So this will go down as yet another shining moment in the annals of government procurement.

But despite what you may think, the government’s real problem wasn’t in the procurement process or obviously less-than-rigorous technical evaluation. It was in the public communication, which was nonexistent. This is a bit of surprise because on average, Chinese government bodies have become significantly better at public communication in the past few years, developing a level of responsiveness to public opinion that would have been unthinkable a couple of decades ago. But the radar was definitely switched off in this situation.

In Imagethief’s personal experience, most Chinese people are relatively sanguine about the Great Firewall (or Net Nanny or Golden Shield or what have you). It doesn’t interfere with most of the things your average Chinese net user wants to do (watching a complete and conveniently subtitled version of the new Star Trek movie on Youku, for instance), and is treated as a kind of necessary but slightly obnoxious inconvenience, like a younger brother who wants to join your pickup soccer game. You can always make him play fullback, where he’ll probably stay out of trouble.

But there is something important about how the mechanism of the Great Firewall relates to this forgiving attitude. The Great Firewall is implemented at a distance from the end user, in the ISPs, routers and gateways that form the infrastructure of the Internet. It’s enforced out in the cloud, and is thus abstract to some degree, even if its effects are apparent in the information you can or cannot access at any given time.

But what the regulator does in the cloud is one thing. What it does when it reaches out and plants its mitts squarely in your computer — your personal computer, in all senses of the word– is entirely different. It is the difference between posting speed limits and deploying the highway patrol on dangerous stretches of road, and putting a governor in your car so it won’t go over 55 mph no matter what you do. The former is completely reasonable for the public good. The latter is an insult to your manhood (unless you’re a woman, in which case it’s presumably an insult to something else).

Now, imagine that the authorities are not only putting a governor in your car, but that it’s a crappy governor that sometimes kicks in when you’re only going 35, stalls the car completely when you break 55 rather than simply limiting your acceleration, and spontaneously unlocks all the doors and starts the engine when car thieves walk by. That’s about where we stand with Green Dam + Youth Escort according to the analyses.

It’s conceivable that the authorities could have pulled this off if they had taken a few basic steps. First, it would have been good to have a period of public consultation. At least that would have provided a chance to assess public reaction and respond appropriately prior to making a commitment. They also could have used that period to defuse some of the negative reaction from the PC manufacturers, all of which are publicly walking a fine diplomatic line, and privately lobbying like Jack Abramoff on poppers and Red Bull. At the risk of letting you see how a PR person thinks (a dark and terrible thing), if I was selling this idea I’d do as much work as I could with grass-roots and community groups and academics to build up the problem of undesirable information with supporting comment from a variety of different directions. I’d run a parallel media compaign also building up the problem and making sure that regulatory interest in a solution was presented in an appropriately benevolent light. Then I’d position the free inclusion of parental control software (and that’s how I’d describe it) with all computers sold in the country as a gift, not as a mandate. Importantly, I’d suggest making it clear that the software is only included with the computer as a disk, and not preinstalled. I’d combine that with community distribution to get the software out to households that already have computers. This puts the software potentially on the desktops of children and students for whom it matters (if you believe in such things) while not wasting time on the committed geeks and randy young men who will immediately scrub the software off of any computer they buy. I’m not saying I like doing this, I’m just saying that’s how I would do it if I had to.

Oh, it would help immeasurably if the software itself wasn’t complete crap. Because I’d also encourage public review of the software itself prior to finalizing the plan. And, after all, you’ll have a much easier time selling this idea to the PC industry and enlisting their support if the PC industry doesn’t think it’s going to break their products.

Instead, the authorities mandated bad software by fiat without warning anyone. In the face of the entirely predictable backlask, they are reduced to their usual double-pronged approach to managing public opinion, telling the mainstream commercial media to tone down the criticism and running a happy-banner up the trusty Xinhua flagpole. Good luck with that. Imagethief stands by his original judgment: In six months, this will all be conveniently flushed down the memory hole. You might want to order a new PC soon just for the souvenir value.

See also:

• Open Net Initiative: China’s Green Dam: The Implications of Government Control Encroaching on the Home PC
• Rebecca MacKinnon: More Green Dam documents and statements
• John Pomfret: China’s rising Internet
• Danwei: Green Dam girl (Well worth your time)
• Danwei: Oddities in the Green Dam filtered words list

Hey, does Green Dam Youth Escort block bunny porn?

Originally reported by the Wall Street Journal and then relayed by the New York Times in somewhat darker terms, the story is that the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, the IT regulator, will require all computers shipped in China after July 1st to include Green Dam Youth Escort, a client-side Internet filtering program (actually two related programs it turns out, “Green Dam” and “Youth Escort”) . The Journal also published a day-after follow-up with some further industry response and third-party comment. The industry response might best be characterized as weary sighs punctuated with occasional slaps to the forehead when they think no one is looking.

Personally, Imagethief isn’t getting his shorts in too much of a twist over this. Don’t misread me: There is nothing to celebrate in yet another measure of government intrusiveness in people’s surfing habits, or the mandating of the use of what is almost certainly a perfectly crappy bit of software. But I’d say that the net effect of Green Dam Youth Escort on Chinese surfing habits will be close to zero.

First of all, it is unclear whether PCs will ship with the software installed. The Wall Street Journal says that the software need only be packaged with PCs sold in China, and not necessarily installed. Rebecca MacKinnon, on the other hand, has received a copy of what is claimed to be the original MIIT notice calling for the use of the software. Her reading is that the document requires that the software be pre-installed on computers. (See also Rebecca’s initial post on the software.)

Even if Green Dam Youth Escort comes pre-installed, however, it seems like the leakiest of dams. After all, what’s to stop anyone acquiring a new computer from simply doing a fresh reinstall of Windows? Certainly no IT administrator at a major corporation –especially a foreign one– will allow this software on company systems, given its apparent propensity to phone home for poorly documented reasons.

And even a post-purchase reinstall won’t be necessary in many situations as I’m sure any DIY vendor at the highly competitive IT malls will sell you a nicely scrubbed box at your convenience. They’re already willing to sell you pirate software and technically illegal mobile phones, so it’s hard to imagine they’ll let a little thing like Green Dam Youth Escort stand between them and a sale.

Also, this is Windows-only software as near as I can tell (the website is not accessible right now, so I can’t confirm). Will Macs and Linux systems be in technical violation? Or will they be conveniently ignored? What about the increasing number of Internet capable mobile handsets that are on the market? Plenty of palm-friendly (I don’t mean it that way, you filthmonger) yellow content out there for on-the-go types.

The claim is that Green Dam Youth Escort is meant primarily to filter pornographic and otherwise socially objectionable content rather than politically objectionable content. It’s hard to imagine that it wouldn’t be used for both, redundant as that seems given existing censorship mechanisms. But the Chinese government has a well established obsession with limiting access to pornography and similarly nasty content. Hence the periodic Internet-purification campaigns and the regular drip-feed of ghastly stories about Internet addiction, young lives ruined, etc.

But if this is really about limiting access to porn, then the effort is even more doomed than I thought. Demand for dissident content is pretty selective despite what people overseas may believe (Imagethief’s Chinese colleagues were annoyed by the recent blocking of Twitter, but mostly for mundane reasons). However, it’s a safe bet on demographic grounds alone that demand for porn is as sky-high among Chinese Internet users as it is anywhere else. Commercial forces alone will doom Green Dam Youth Escort (unless it’s actually linked to an escort service, which seems unlikely). After all, look how miserably government attempts to limit online game playing worked. It took a commercial issue to deny Chinese gamers access to World of Warcraft for any significant amount of time.

Imagethief detects the whiff of a sweetheart deal. Certainly the company that produced the software, Jinhui Computer System Engineering Company, will cash a nice check from the government, which will apparently underwrite the inclusion of the program. But client-side filtering software, even if updated from a central database, is principally useful at an organizational level, such as by a company or household, where policies need to be set locally. If the government wants to set policy for the entire country, then China’s existing DNS, ISP and gateway-based filtering mechanisms are much more efficient and, for all their porousness, harder to circumvent. If Chinese ISPs start denying connectivity to clients not running Green Dam Youth Escort, then I’ll panic. But I don’t see how that’s feasible (and if it gets tried, stand-by for the slap-fight of the century between MIIT and MOFCOM).

Frankly, despite the inevitable hand-wringing and bluster, I wouldn’t be surprised to see the whole initiative vanish quietly after a few face-saving months.

*NB: The Chevy Nova story is actually bullshit, but it lives in legend.

Update:

From Malcom Moore’s story on this in the Telegraph, this outstanding quote from the Jinhui spokeswoman:

“This is very good news for users, so they should not uninstall it. It will automatically filter pornographic images and antirevolutionary content. It will not take up much space on the hard drive. It is very stable and we have conducted many tests already,” [the spokeswoman] added.

As if. Also, screenshots here (in Chinese) courtesy of @davesgonechina.

Update 2:

Speaking of handwringing, this quote from the AP’s coverage:

John Palfrey, an Internet censorship expert at Harvard University, described the latest requirements as “a potential game changer in the story of Internet control,” by moving China’s “Great Firewall” closer to the user, where censorship can be more effective.

Game changing indeed. As long as the game is strip-Parcheesi played by monkeys in diapers. I disagree that censorship is more effective when it’s closer to the user. I think it’s more effective when it’s centralized for the reasons described above. Ask the DVD consortium how they feel about device-level security restrictions in China (although it’s an imperfect comparison as the government doesn’t give a crap about DVD piracy). Still, unless something completely unexpected is sprung in the implementation of this software, getting it off of your computer will be about as easy as hitting a dead sturgeon with a fork.

Update 3 (June 10):

The government and Jinhui both insist it’s not spyware. So that’s OK then, but I notice nobody insists its not crappy software, as alleged elsewhere. Bonus: The Foreign Ministry spokesman claims that China’s internet has always been “open”. Which is true, if by “open” you mean “restricted”.

Also, Bruce Einhorn of BusinessWeek writes about the lack of consultation with the industry over this move, and what that says about the Chinese approach to regulation.

Also on Imagethief:

• Communication is the real lesson from the Green Dam Youth Escort fiasco

I can't see any sea cucumbers, but look what Edison's doing with this girl!

The New York Times has an interesting story about Chinese Internet users putting a stick in government efforts to “purify the Internet” with various plays on a rude pun: 草泥马. Read “cáo ní mă“, it means “grass mud horse”. It’s also, however, a few tones away from the scorching but well-worn vulgarity “操你妈”, which is read “cào nĭ mā” and means (send the children out of the room) “fuck your mother”. From the Times:

A YouTube children’s song about the beast has drawn nearly 1.4 million viewers. A grass-mud horse cartoon has logged a quarter million more views. A nature documentary on its habits attracted 180,000 more. Stores are selling grass-mud horse dolls. Chinese intellectuals are writing treatises on the grass-mud horse’s social importance. The story of the grass-mud horse’s struggle against the evil river crab has spread far and wide across the Chinese online community.

Not bad for a mythical creature whose name, in Chinese, sounds very much like an especially vile obscenity. Which is precisely the point.

The grass-mud horse is an example of something that, in China’s authoritarian system, passes as subversive behavior. Conceived as an impish protest against censorship, the foul-named little horse has not merely made government censors look ridiculous, although it has surely done that.

Have a read, and make sure you visit some of the linked videos. One of them will ensure you never think about alpacas the same way again. Nasty looking beasts. [Original video now deleted, but re-uploaded by Rebecca McKinnon here.]

Imagethief, a labored speaker of Chinese at best, is no expert on Mandarin profanity or puns, although I have an academic appreciation for the latter. But as with any passenger of Beijing taxis, I am well acquainted with “cào nĭ mā“, and its common accompaniment, the hissed “shaaaaabi!” (You can look it up on the Wikipedia page linked right above.) I hastily point out that these are generally directed at other drivers and pedestrians, and rarely at Imagethief.

Sound-alikes and double entendres are important in Chinese (think of all the words that are auspicious or inauspicious because they sound like something else), and they certainly have played role in the ongoing dance between Chinese Internet users and censors. But I rather think this story reads a bit too much significance into what is, at the end of the day, a naughty pun:

It has also raised real questions about China’s ability to stanch the flow of information over the Internet — a project on which the Chinese government already has expended untold riches, and written countless software algorithms to weed deviant thought from the world’s largest cyber-community.

Perhaps. But the idiosyncrasies of the Chinese language cut both ways. Have a read of ESWN’s translation of a recent Southern Metropolis Daily article on “The Seven Possible Fates of an Internet Post” which talks about how many BBS postings get filtered because of accidental character combinations that look like forbidden terms. And also have a read of James Fallows’ excellent Atlantic Monthly article on China’s Internet censorship from almost exactly one year ago, perhaps the best analysis so far in mainstream media.

The goal of Chinese Internet censorship is not absolute control, but sufficient inconvenience and management to keep most people people on the straight-and-narrow. In that context, some naughty puns, even ones that encode an implicit criticism of censorship, can probably be thought of as a feature, if an annoying one, rather than a bug. Poke some fun. Have some laughs. Don’t cross the red lines. I’d guess that the authorities are pretty comfortable waiting for people to get bored and move on to the next allegorical pun.

See also:

• Danwei: Dirty words in the mainstream media
• Beijing Sounds: Beating a dead grass mud horse 

The other difference is that the government has explicit power over the media agenda. Most of the time, self-censorship is the rule. However the propaganda ministry –中宣部– also sends out guidance on sensitive issues to major media. Editors who want to keep their jobs are expected to toe the line. Occasionally an acute issue will motivate a directive to halt coverage of a topic, as when media were directed to layoff the Foxconn-Apple scandal of last year. (Recently this has led to proscribed topics sloshing over into journalists’ and editors’ blogs, but that’s a topic for ESWN.)

We were reminded of the realities of government management of the media agenda recently, shortly after arranging an interview between one of our MNC clients and a Chinese business magazine. The magazine in question had requested the interview, with an eye on exploring our client’s business and investments in China. The discussion was vigorous but reasonably balanced and we were expecting a decent article as a result, with publication planned prior to Chinese New Year.

About two weeks after the interview, one of the editors involved called us and said the story would be “delayed”. Apparently the magazine had just received guidance from the Propaganda Ministry to be more “sensitive” in publishing stories that involved foreign investment, particularly around certain industries or well-known Chinese brands. We had not, at first blush, considered the story we were developing to be particularly risky or sensitive. But the journalists and editors at the magazine were, as you would expect, taking the ministerial guidance extremely seriously. So we had to wait, and so did our client.

But clients who make busy senior (foreign) executives available expect explanations about these kinds of things. “Hey, dude, it’s China,” doesn’t really cut it, so we did a little poking around. The back-story is illustrative of one of the challenges of the PR biz in China.

Anyone who follows current affairs in China will know that these are delicate times for discussing the topic of foreign investment. Questions are being raised about the quality of foreign investment and the intent behind it. Early last November the 11th Five Year Plan was published. It put a great deal of emphasis on the quality of foreign investment. In this English Xinhua article about the plan, the money graf –as far as we were concerned– is the very last one:

In response to the rising concern over foreign acquisitions of leading Chinese firms in critical sectors, the document says China will speed up legislation and step up the supervision of sensitive acquisitions and takeovers to ensure critical industries and enterprises remain under Chinese control.

Shortly thereafter, it seems the initial guidance to treat reporting around this topic sensitively was passed on to at least some Chinese media. The publication we were dealing with was government-linked, and had little wiggle-room as far as interpreting this directive to be “sensitive”. Unfortunately, apparently, they had somehow missed the memo and in their previous issue published an article that had raised eyebrows upstairs. This had resulted in a ministerial reminder to toe the line, which descended, Rumsfeldian snowflake fashion, into the in-boxes of the editors of the magazine we were working with the day before they called to tell us that they had to postpone.

My initial response when the Chinese media-relations guru on my team told me that the magazine had to postpone the story because of a government directive was to assume they were giving me a polite brush-off. Similar, perhaps, to what you might get if a Western editor didn’t like the story a journalist had put together on your client, and the journalist in question wanted to tell you something more polite than, “The editor thinks your interview was crap on a stick.”

“Are they yanking our chain?” was the first question I asked her. Some of our other Chinese team members, including one of our government relations people, had the same first reaction, so it wasn’t just foreigner-itis. But after some research and phone calls turned up the story above I changed my opinion. At the very least, if it was an excuse, it was a damn well substantiated one with abundant face-saving for everyone. In which case, my face duly saved, I could sleep well at night.

The net result, however, is that our story went on the back burner, where it remains until the publication feels that it can once again broach the topic of foreign investment in certain industries, or hell freezes over (whichever comes first). And now I have one more piece of due-diligence to do when identifying Chinese media to work with in future.

Such is one of the many things that make PR in China such a rush.

“The Chinese should develop more efficient ways of communicating with the outside world,” said Wu Jianmin, president of the Foreign Affairs College and former Chinese Ambassador to France.

“An acclaimed foreign expert on China once told me China’s distorted image would be the largest obstacle for its further development,” Wu said. “Sometimes, even when information is reported objectively, it can still send the wrong signals.”

For example, some media focus too much on China’s GDP or exports growth, giving the foreign audience an impression that everything in China is rosy, but they forget the cost of the successes, for example harm to the environment, Wu said.

***

Experts believe Chinese media are facing tough challenges in communicating with overseas audiences. “The most difficult thing is that the most talented professionals are gravitating towards higher-paid jobs,” said Ma Shengrong, vice president of Xinhua News Agency.

“The voices of the Chinese media are still weak on the world stage due to various factors, including the difficulty of translating some Chinese values and phrases into English,” he added.

I am inclined to agree with those “experts” cited in the second to last paragraph, above. However, while loss of talent and translation may be part of the problem, I think they fit into a much larger picture that is conspicuously ignored by the article.

First, the general quality of China’s English language media is, by international standards, dismal. There are certainly talented people, both Chinese and foreign, working for China’s various international news services, but for various reasons the average level of quality in both print and broadcast is simply not up to international standards. This is true in the details, like copy editing in much of the English language print media and the foreign talent (in the broadcast sense) employed by CCTV 9, and in a broader sense, in the editing, story selection and frequent ham-fisting of the political slant.

All of these issues, however, are descended from the larger problem, the elephant in the room studiously overlooked in the article above. China’s international news services are explicit state propaganda organs. It is pointless to discuss whether Chinese media organizations are following a balanced editorial line, especially on issues that impact the image of China abroad, when the editorial line is heavily influenced if not dictated by the state. Even the perception of that influence is damaging, and tends to drive foreigners away or make them wary.

China isn’t unique in having state news organizations that fill a propaganda role. The United States maintains several state propaganda media agencies, and plenty of other nations do the same. And I would argue that there is a legitimate role for these kinds of organizations in the grand scheme of things. But China’s authoritarian government, with its reputation for micromanaging state public relations issues and zealous propaganda apparatus, will be seen by overseas audiences –correctly, I believe– as being much more deeply involved in the day-to-day operations of China’s international news services than the governments of liberal democracies are in most of their own. This is a problem for China, because I am sure that it wants CCTV9 to be seen as a peer of the BBC World Service or even the Voice of America more than as a peer of the North Korean KCNA. It certainly wants Xinhua to be seen as a credible global wire and financial information service, as we’ve all been recently reminded. But as long as its news organizations are seen as propaganda first and news second they’ll receive an immediate and steep credibility discount from foreign audiences.

The propaganda link and the general stodginess and stuffiness of state media probably also play a role in the talent drain as well. When state media was the only show in town that wouldn’t have been a problem. But China has an increasingly lively commercial media that is competing with the state behemoths for talent, including some magazines and newspapers with very good reputations. They might be subject to tight state regulation, but that’s not the same thing as being state-run. Also, there is an increasing number of foreign media organizations (and PR agencies) in China that are also able to woo the best and brightest, especially if they have English or other foreign language skills.

As for the ability to attract foreigners, I am acquainted with some smart and talented foreigners who have worked in Chinese state media. Many were fresh graduates or very young professionals for whom a year or two in Chinese state media was a reasonable way to work in China while moving toward a job in a foreign news organization or a grad school spot back home. Most of the older pros, however, had either grown an armor of cynicism or undergone a tortuous process of rationalization (or become embittered bloggers). And all foreigners working in Chinese state media, and especially the television presenters, had better reconcile themselves to being seen as complicit in China’s propaganda regimen, and to absorbing some of the bitter and often racially-tinged scorn that foreigners reserve for compatriots who are seen to have sold out their dignity or values to carry the Chinese government line. This scorn isn’t always fairly dispensed or justified, but it is there nonetheless.

Glossing up the production values in both print and broadcast might help, but it won’t be a solution as long as the hand of the state is seen to loom over newsrooms. Singapore, which has tried to turn its Channel News Asia cable news station into a regional equivalent of CNN has experienced some of this. CNA is relatively slick, manned by native English speakers, and should be able offer unique insight into Asia. But as long as parent Mediacorp and CNA are perceived as subservient to the Singapore government’s agenda other governments will be suspicious of them and people –especially the educated, affluent international businesspeople who make advertisers’ mouths water– will reach first for CNN, the BBC or their local equivalent.

The competition, every other English language print and television news source in the world, will be tough. Many of those organizations have cultivated reputations over decades. Ultimately success will come down to building a solid track record of good programming, editing and talent. China’s international media can’t be run like an English version of domestic media, which is what happens now. Foreign viewers won’t endure a stream of turgid articles reciting awkwardly translated political slogans and concepts, or news spots showing the Chinese leadership’s daily activities in protocol order. Even the Chinese seem to be growing considerably less patient with that, judging from the increasingly zippy and salacious Chinese language media. In fact, if the Chinese really want their global programming to fly, they might consider a significantly lighter government touch, perhaps just laying down some ground rules. That might enable them to do something else helpful, and hire top-flight, experienced foreigners or returnee Chinese from developed media markets to program or help edit. After all, Al-Jazeera has gleefully raided the BBC in its quest for respectability.

Such a move seems beyond the pale for the Chinese leadership and for the moment it probably is. The instinct to closely manage the media is probably too strong for the government to trust foreigners or even returnees to get too close to levers of power, although they’re welcome to copy edit and be talking heads. But as long they keep sailing the same path they have been, Xinhua the People’s Daily, China Daily and other English print media are doomed to be little more than attributions in foreign news reports and CCTV9 is destined to be a station of some use to locals practicing English, but shunned by most foreigners with access to anything better.

Note: See also the Peking Duck, especially the comment thread, in which a very good point is made. There is no monolithic “foreign” market, or even a monolithic “English language” market. Reaching out to Americans will be different than reaching out to Australians, Singaporeans or English speaking Italians for that matter. But every international broadcaster deals with that by either segmenting its programming, having different channels or publications, or targeting a narrower segment that crosses nationalities such as businesspeople. For the purposes of reaching a global audience, even via other country’s media, one of the best resources the Chinese ought to have at their disposal is savvy, quotable press officers with local knowledge stationed at embassies around the world. However one gets the sense that those people aren’t always the most quotable individuals around.

I read the written testimony submitted by the four companies, although I’ve not read a full transcript of the Q&A. All the companies pretty much responded as expected. They all, without fail, talked about the transformative power of the Internet and the benefits it is bringing to China. They all tried to explain how they’ve weighed the implications of being in China.

They also all addressed the specifics of their individual cases. Cisco explained that it sells the exact same equipment to China that it sells to anyone else, without special modification, and that the technology that enables content filtering is the same that enables network security. Yahoo addressed the Shi Tao case, and the fact that operational control of Yahoo China lies essentially entirely with Jack Ma’s Alibaba.com (a risk that may haunt them in future, since it may place the brand at risk). Microsoft discussed the Michael Anti case. And Google, of course, discussed the considerations that went into the recent launch of their self-censored google.cn site, as well as the ongoing drop in their market share that they feel is rooted in filtering-based performance issues.

It was thoughtful, rational and articulate. It was full of motherhood statements about the Internet company values. It was, in short, exactly what you’d expect from three general counsels (Microsoft, Yahoo and Cisco) and a vice president of global communications (Google).

For instance, here is Microsoft Associate General Counsel, Jack Krumholtz:

Will the citizens of that country be better off without access to our services, or will their absence just vindicate those who see our presence in the country as threatening to their official or commercial interests?

And Yahoo General Counsel, Michael Callahan:

First, our principles. Since our founding in 1995, Yahoo! has been guided by beliefs deeply held by our founders and sustained by our employees. We believe the Internet can positively transform lives, societies, and economies.

These were all the messages that needed to be delivered. But I see two problems. First, as expected, they lost the war of imagery and emotion. Out of necessity, the companies needed to be defensive and rational. Unlike their interrogators, who are playing to voters only, they are playing to three separate constituencies: the general public who are their customers and advertisers; the shareholders to whom they have fiduciary obligations; and the Chinese government, who was no doubt watching very carefully. Addressing all three of those audiences requires a measured and diplomatic approach. But in the war for general public opinion, they are then left contending with statements like this from Representative Chris Smith:

Through an approach that monitors, filters, and blocks content with the use of technology and human monitors, the Chinese people have little access to uncensored information about any political or human rights topic, unless of course, Big Brother wants them to see it. Google.cn, China’s search engine, is guaranteed to take you to the virtual land of deceit, disinformation and the big lie.

But the worst came in an act of confrontational demagoguery from Congressman Tom Lantos, a man who represents Imagethief’s home constituency in the San Francisco Bay Area, who carries the unimpeachable aura of a Holocaust survivor (a fact cited in most articles I read about his participation in the subcommittee) and who has long taken a dim view of China’s government (opposed WTO entry, opposed awarding the Olympics, etc.).  Lantos notoriously called all four company representatives on the carpet, asking each in turn if he was ashamed of the actions of his company. From a longer transcript on CNET:

Rep. Tom Lantos: Can you say in English that you’re ashamed of what your company and what the other companies have done?

Google: Congressman, I actually can’t, I don’t think it’s fair for us to say that we’re ashamed.

Lantos: You have nothing to be ashamed of?

Google: I am not ashamed of it, and I am not proud of it…We have taken a path, we have begun on a path, we have done a path that…will ultimately benefit all the users in China. If we determined, congressman, as a result of changing circumstances or as a result of the implementation of the Google.cn program that we are not achieving those results then we will assess our performance, our ability to achieve those goals, and whether to remain in the market.

Yow. Trapped. A seven word question that will stick in everyone’s head, and an eighty-three word response that no one will remember, but precious few better options considering those three different constituencies. Maybe I’m getting conservative in my middle-age (I’m a longtime liberal Democrat), or maybe the CCP is spiking my drinking water, but I didn’t think much of Mr. Lantos’ approach. Here is another statement, from the press release Lantos issued the day before the hearings:

“The hugely successful businesses that come before Congress tomorrow will have to account for their complicity in China’s culture of repression, and to begin to make amends,” Lantos said. “Government can be expected to do only so much. It is up to these wealthy entrepreneurs to help ensure that the free flow of information from which they have profited is offered worldwide.”

Well, aside from the fact that the final statement is patently wrong, this does raise a very interesting question that cuts to the heart of my complaint about how the companies dealt with the hearings. While I don’t think the wealthy entrepreneurs have any obligation to ensure that a free flow of information is offered worldwide (that ignores political realities that extend far beyond China and in cases may simply not make business sense), I am a little mystified as to their silence.

Here is why. The technology industry suffers from an interesting syndrome. It is a time honored practice among tech companies to build founders and CEOs up as evangelical prophets of the transformative power of technology, which is promoted as revolutionary and encompassing in a way that, say, shipping, fast-moving consumer goods, cars, energy, and so on are not. No industry is more susceptible to the CEO/founder cult of personality or mystique, and no industry more flagrantly positions founders and CEOs as “visionaries” than the tech industry does. This is especially important in the Internet generation of companies, all of whom were created in the last fifteen years and are still led by founders. It is only slightly less true for Microsoft.

The cult of the youthful billionaire genius touches three of the four companies involved in these hearings. Bill Gates of Microsoft may be the pre-eminent technologist of the age. Jerry Yang and David Filo of Yahoo are famous and highly visible, as is CEO Terry Semel, a Hollywood veteran who knows a thing or two about showmanship. And Sergey Brin and Larry Page of Google are in a league all their own. Cisco may suffer from less of this syndrome because, although it is young and CEO John Chambers is well known, it is not first and foremost a consumer oriented firm as the other three are.

Where were all these Internet visionaries as this storm broke?

This is an important question because, Cisco aside, these firms are all, for better or for worse, closely associated with the personal values of their highly visible founders. Those values are part of what defines their public images and brands. This is especially true of Google, where the relationship between the founders’ values and the company’s values are formalized in the “Don’t Be Evil” mantra that has become such a millstone during the controversy. On page 211 of David Vise’s book, The Google Story (as unanalytical a bit of hagiography as you will find), it is recalled that:

Stanford Professor Terry Winograd says that Segey [Brin] has lead the way on three Ps: Policy, Politics and People. (When once asked what the motto Don’t Be Evil meant, CEO Eric Schmidt famously replied that evil is whatever Sergey says is evil.)

And on page 257 it says.

[Google's] very motto, Don’t Be Evil, was a thinly veiled way of letting the technologists of the world know that Larry and Sergey were not just the Google Guys, but the Good Guys, who did the right thing for users and employees and had fun too.

That’s channeling founders’ values through the company, and using them to build the brand. Michael Callahan of Yahoo does the same thing in his testimony, quoted above. And it makes the silence of all these technology luminaries in the breach seem odd and  somehow discordant.

One of the most common requests that crosses Imagethief’s desk is for communication plans to help technology executives position themselves as “thought leaders”. Unfortunately, “thought leadership” is an often abused concept in PR, with salesmanship, cheerleading and banality often masquerading in its place. The most interesting proposals are often rejected as too risky. Certainly thought leadership is easier when times are good. But it’s important when controversy arises, such as now. On the table is one of the most important issues of our time: what is the relationship between a commercial Internet and the right to freedom of speech, and should the American companies who are driving the evolution of the Internet be considered international custodians of that right?

Leadership is about risk (something that these entrepreneurs all know). Thought leadership is about intellectual risk. If it is unlikely to be argued with or shouted down, it’s probably not thought leadership. This was an opportunity for thought leadership if ever there was one. But there was little thought leadership to be had. That is a shame, because I am sure that all of these phenomenally bright and opinionated technologists are thinking deeply about this issue and debating it inside their companies.

But maybe there was no other choice. As I noted above, the companies are burdened with three different audiences, each of which has a substantially different interest in this situation. Consumers and advertisers want to feel good about the brands of the companies they patronize. Shareholders want growth. China wants foreign firms to toe the line and avoid controversy. Employees may even constitute a fourth important group in this kind of situation. That puts the companies in a supremely delicate position, where every public communication has to be considered from multiple angles if a disaster is to be averted.

But if you build your brand on the company founders’ values and leadership, and they then remain silent when those values are being questioned and leadership is most necessary, then your brand is at risk. And, in the meantime, people with fewer stakeholders to please will hammer at you from all sides.

After hearing reports that American tech giants like Microsoft and Yahoo are abiding by Chinese law mandating Internet censorship, some irritated U.S. politicians are threatening to pass laws restricting such cooperation.

Rep. Christopher Smith, a New Jersey Republican, said Thursday that the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Human Rights, which he heads, will hold a hearing in early to mid- February. Smith has invited representatives from the U.S. State Department, Microsoft, Yahoo, Cisco Systems, Google, and the international watchdog group Reporters Without Borders to speak.

The effort is designed to determine what can be done, either by legislative mandate or on a voluntary basis, to “dissociate a company from working hand-in-glove with a dictatorship,” Smith said in a telephone interview with CNET News.com.

A similar hearing is planned for Feb. 1 in the Congressional Human Rights Caucus said Ryan Keating, communications director for Rep. Tim Ryan, the Ohio Democrat leading the parallel effort. The caucus, unlike the human rights subcommittee, is an “informal” committee that is overseen by about 30 House members and includes a few hundred others, Smith among them, as supporting members.

Both Ryan and Smith are in the process of concocting new laws, which will likely take cues from recommendations issued by Reporters Without Borders and the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, a 12-member, congressionally-selected governmental panel.

Paris-based Reporters Without Borders this week backed a law banning an American company from hosting an e-mail server in any “repressive” country. It’s also suggested that American corporations come up with a joint plan for how to handle censorship requests from foreign governments, including refusal to censor terms like “democracy” and “human rights.”

The companies have defended their decisions by saying that, as multinational corporations, they had no choice but to comply with Chinese mandates.

The highlight in the above quote is added by me because I think that’s the money paragraph. This is attempt to pressure Internet companies into dissociating themselves with China’s regime, and its policies. In fact, that statement is broad enough to encompass any kind of company that does business with the Chinese government, which is to say almost any foreign company in China. The article is substantial, and worth a read.

I am going to put on my PR black hat, distance myself emotionally from this situation, and look at it from a professional point of view. From where I observe, this issue is gaining momentum, and will become increasingly important for US Internet firms doing business in China. If they handle it poorly they will either find themselves legislated out of the country or, more likely, on receiving end of a growing tide of public opprobrium. Either could cause business problems and damage brand and shareholder vale.

Back in September, when the Yahoo/Shi Tao affair was emerging, I wrote the following:

[I] wonder if it will start impacting technology firms internationally. I think back to noisy, well-organized public campaigns against companies doing business in apartheid-era South Africa, or in Myanmar. So far, the calls against tech firms complicit in censorship (and now arrests) in China have been pretty scattered, and confined primarily to the digerati rather than to the great mass of customers. That might change.

So far, most of the firms confronted have given variations on the “we comply with the laws of our host country” explanation. This is accurate and understandable, but as a PR holding statement it doesn’t do much to diffuse the perception that western tech firms are knuckling under to a repressive government in search of massive bucks. Just the thing to put college students in a righteous snit. Yahoo! hasn’t issued a statement on this situation that I can find, which is also not a great idea because NGOs like Human Rights Watch and Reporters Without Borders are busy filling the silence.

I can see the dilemma for big, listed Internet companies. Their shareholders will punish them ruthlessly if they aren’t aggressively pursuing the Chinese market. But to do business in China, they have to submit to the Chinese government, in all it’s capriciousness. These are really media companies – the only foreign media companies allowed to do business here – with real influence over Chinese people and a commensurate level of scrutiny from the authorities. But none of them will dare forsake the market on principles, and that leaves them vulnerable to [PR problems].

In retrospect, I should have said, “put college students and congressmen in a righteous snit”. The comparison with Apartheid-era regulations and public pressure is what has stuck in my mind since this issue started boiling, and I see more and more of that in the growing outcry. The spread of awareness of this situation beyond the digerati and into congressional human-rights committees will drive it further into the mainstream agenda, following already widespread mainstream coverage of the recent MSN/Anti affair. RSF is a well organized and media-savvy pressure group (as one would expect), and will certainly do its utmost to ensure that remains the case. (It’s also worth reading MacKinnon’s critique of RSF’s current, problematic petition on this issue. RSF’s site is, ahem, blocked in China, but the text of their proposal is also on Declan McCullagh’s blog.)

Just over a week ago, I wrote a post analyzing Microsoft’s motivations for keeping the Chinese government on-side. Its situation is not unique, and most American Internet companies are negotiating a similarly complex web of issues in a staggeringly complex regulatory and governmental environment. In that post, I reiterated that I would like to see US Internet companies taking a much more open approach to communicating around how and why they do business in China, and what policies they follow and will enforce. In response to that, a good friend of mine who works at Cisco (and who’s name will soon appear again in a forthcoming post on crappy automobiles) wrote a rational and thoughtful comment on why most companies, ever conscious of their legal exposure and share price, would be horrified at such an approach. It’s worth reading [note: the comment originally linked to here is no longer online -WM].

But I think the CNET article above illustrates the countervailing risks of following a strategy of opacity. When you leave space, forces opposed to your interests will likely fill it. And the more this issue penetrates into the mainstream, the more of those forces there will be. I think it’s unlikely –at least in the near future– that the US government will legislate in a way that prevents US Internet companies from doing business in China. Regardless of the outcome of congressional testimony, too many dollars are at stake, and the lobbyists will already be sharpening their policy papers and booking tables at lavish restaurants. But it is possible that legislation could be passed, and that would significantly damage or destroy the China business prospects for US Internet companies by making a huge, potential audience either inaccessible, or far less accessible (since the Chinese will simply block access to the US versions of services they don’t care for). Even if legislation is not passed, consumer pressure, in the form of boycotts or other activism, could damage the reputation and sales of US Internet companies. Third party nations more easily swayed by NGO arguments might apply their own sanctions against US Internet firms, especially if goaded by domestic competition. None of this might come to pass, but these are the risks that should be considered.

Three things give this situation legs it might not otherwise have. First, while many US companies do business in many dodgy regimes, none of those regimes is positioned as a major strategic rival to the US. Anti-China sentiment runs high these days. If you need to be refreshed on that, review some articles about CNOOC’s attempted takeover of Unocal last year, the valuation of the yuan or Pentagon appraisals of Chinese military capabilities. As a result, China is visible in the US in a way that very few foreign countries are. Second, running a polluting refinery or setting up sweatshops in third world countries, to pick just a couple of examples, are reprehensible. However neither cuts against the grain of a fundamental American value. If you ask random Americans on the street to name a freedom guaranteed by the US Constitution, chances are that “freedom of speech” will be at or near the to of list. Freedom of speech is a pillar of American national self-image, and when American companies are seen to be betraying that pillar you move into very charged and dangerous territory. Combine that with all the baggage around China and you can see where the risk comes from. (This is not, of course, solely an American issue, as VOiP operator Skype is now discovering.)

I have mixed feelings about this situation. I have used the Internet since 1993 and run my own website or blog for much of that time. My master’s thesis (in a broadcasting program) was written about the Internet in 1995, with a focus on its mass media potential and censorship and popular media issues. I spent several years working as an Internet and e-commerce consultant before moving into technology PR. I am attracted to the Internet for its media aspects far more than its ability to, say, improve supply chains or procurement. I believe that the strongest societies encourage free and open exchanges of ideas. I’m a blogger. Therefore I tend to react with visceral loathing to censorship and media controls. Hence my description of the deleting of Michael Anti’s blog in a previous post as “abhorrent”. In general, I still stand by that assessment.

Stepping back from that, however, and divorcing my natural inclination to project my Yanqui values onto China from my analysis, I come to the following conclusions:

1) American Internet firms should not quit or be drummed out of China
That is pointless for everyone involved. At worst, American Internet firms here operate subject to the same requirements as Chinese ones. At best, they offer a valuable alternative that still functions as a gateway to a wider world, even if parts of it are missing. Drive American Internet firms out and everyone goes to Baidu and Bokee, or their brethren, and you slam the door on the one area of Chinese media that is open to foreigners to any degree at this point. I am not sure how that helps to carry the standard of liberty to Chinese Internet users (assuming this is neccessary – see below), although it does deny business opportunities to American companies. Furthermore, every foreign company that operates in China is somehow in hock to the regime, if even indirectly. Are you prepared to tell Boeing, GM, IBM, Intel, GE and all the other pillars of American industry to get out of China as well? All of these companies engage the Chinese government, seek its custom and pay taxes in China. Were I one of these firms, I would be extremely worried about the precedent that pressure on US Internet companies might set.

China isn’t Myanmar, North Korea, 1980s South Africa or some other politically inconvenient backwater that can be isolated and forgotten about. It is an emerging great power and an immense US trading partner increasingly bound with America’s economy on a number of fronts. The implications of isolating it, were that even possible, run beyond inconveniencing a few American corporations and extend deep into the realms of foreign policy, economics and Asian security.

2) There are shades of gray in this situation
We see the Internet companies as different because we see freedom of speech as different — as a universal human right. But, as an intellectual exercise, let me pose the following: even in the US has limitations on freedom of speech. No libel; no obscenity; no yelling fire in a crowded theater. All of these limitations are predicated on mitigating harm (libel, false advertising) or respecting established social boundaries (obscenity). One might, then, concede that different countries and societies might set the boundaries of permissible free speech in different places based on those same criteria. Now, if you are China, and obsessed with maintaining social harmony in a fractious country of 1.3 billion, the vast majority of whom are shockingly poor, you might interpret the role of free speech in society somewhat different than developed, Western countries. Now, this doesn’t excuse locking up journalists or arbitrary censorship of politically inconvenient opinions. And it certainly doesn’t excuse cloaking regime-preservation in the trappings of respect for social boundaries. But it does serve as a warning to beware of letting ethnocentric value-creep color your arguments. China is not the US or Western Europe and it never will be.

There are also shades of gray in the prosecution of restrictions on speech. Removing blogs and filtering websites and keywords is a shame, but I will entertain a defense of it (note that this is different than agreeing with it) in the interest of keeping your business in China. Thought it might be antithetical to our values, it’s hard, without verging into philosophy, to argue that anyone is being directly harmed. However, supporting arbitrary prosecutions and application of the notoriously malleable “state secrets” law and jailing of inconvenient journalists and activists for long periods is hard to defend. Where, then, is the line of complicity that American Internet firms should not cross? When is it OK to surrender information to the authorities? Dare an American firm question when a Chinese prosecution is justified and when it is not? Probably not. As ESWN has pointed out in a post worth reading, if a foreign company operating in China is served with a legal warrant by the authorities, it probably has no choice but to comply. The PR risk in this situation –beyond the obvious– is that companies desperate to protect their interests in China may take a liberal interpretation of what represents due process in China. An informal “request” from the Chinese government may not have legal force, but in a country where government patronage is crucial to many businesses, that may not matter. The Gods of PR (dark and terrible gods that they are) help any American company found to have been surrendering information on Chinese users via extra-legal processes. That’s why it is important to articulate under what circumstances records will be turned over.

3) The debate will be framed in an oversimplified view of China
Those who argue that US Internet firms should either get out of China or reject government demands to filter content (which equals getting out of China) will likely frame the debate in very stark terms rooted in fiery rhetoric about the evils of the CCP, China’s sinister national ambitions and the need to protect universal values (a malleable concept) and to pressure China to improve its human rights. Many of the people making those arguments won’t know much about China, or will ignore nuanced reality in the pursuit of powerful headlines that can advance agendas. (Example: here are the digerati of Boing Boing with a satirical image that aptly demonstrates how even US cultural sophisticates view China.)

China’s government is pretty awful in a lot of obvious ways, but it is not some cackling, cartoon vulture perched atop the nation. It is not a caricature dictatorship or a Kim Jong-il-style one-man fiefdom (at least, not anymore). For all its problems, the government here has genuine ambitions for improving the country. But it governs 1.3 billion people –that’s four USAs–, two thirds of whom are desperately poor and many of whom speak different dialects, and who are beset by a range of tensions and deeply structural problems. Furthermore, the Chinese government cannot rapidly escape the legacy of its origins. It is factional and divided and there is often a pronounced lack of common cause between the central government and provincial and local governments. Progress will not be smooth or even.

But there is progress. Consider where this country was thirty years ago, when it was just emerging from the Cultural Revolution. In the space of one generation it has gone from complete isolation and destitution to a fair state of development and engagement with the world. The target audiences that US Internet firms are trying to reach are the children of people who lived through Cultural Revolution as youths. To make this example more accessible to Americans, basketball player Yao Ming’s mother was a Red Guard. Think about the progress this represents. Where once there was uniform poverty there is now growing prosperity. Where once there was isolation there are deepening international connections. Where once there was only state controlled  propaganda there is now a lively and growing commercial media, and a fair amount of access to international media. This doesn’t excuse the bad things that the government does, but it highlights that we are not talking about a Myanmar-style irredeemable military dictatorship or a sub-Saharan kleptocracy busy reducing its people to ever greater penury.

4) Chinese Internet users may not need or want to be rescued by us
When MSN killed off Michael Anti’s blog he didn’t need help from an NGO to move to Blog City (blocked in China, I note with some irony). Chinese people aren’t idiots or naifs wandering in the wilderness, waiting to be lead to civilization by foreigners. Certainly in my office they discuss government control and management of information matter-of-factly (of course, they are all also media experts).

We westerners seem to be conflicted in how we feel about China. We have an idealistic conviction that the simple flow of our ideas and culture and the relentless march of technology will somehow precipitate change, yet we can’t resist an interventionist desire to actively impose our values. At the same time we mythologize China into something unknowable and impenetrable. The result is that no matter what we do we risk patronizing the Chinese Internet users we want to help, and driving them further away.

Imposing foreign activism on China has a pretty dismal record of failure. In a country where nationalist sentiment runs high and is easily provoked, it is liable to backfire. Imagine for a moment that American Internet firms are drummed out of China by legislation or activism. My guess is that Chinese youth would not swell with admiration for courageous, highly-principled foreign companies. Rather, they would likely seethe with nationalist contempt for companies that don’t “get” China and for foreign governments that are trying to dictate what is good for China. That won’t do wonders for dialogue. I can tell you who would be happy though: Bokee (who launched a devastatingly self-interested attack on MSN prior to Anti’s removal, as reported here by ESWN) and other Chinese blogging engines who would be pleased to see off foreign competition.

Not that they need to at the moment. Most Western Internet companies in China are not doing very well. In the grand scheme of forces affecting China, the inclination of American (as opposed to Chinese) Internet companies to toe the censorship line is so far down the list as to be nearly beneath concern. The free operation of China’s domestic mainstream media ranks substantially higher. Although the two issues are tangentially connected via the Shi Tao case, US Internet companies and American interventionism are probably not the key to freeing Chinese media. (Howard French’s recent International Herald Tribune opinion piece on China’s information control efforts is worth reading.)

What does all this mean for communication?
I have said many times that the “just obeying local laws” excuse, widely used by American Internet firms when they explain their compliance with Chinese censorship requirements, is inadequate. It is inadequate because it ignores the visceral reaction that their American stakeholders have to issues of censorship and free speech and the emotionally and politically-charged complexities of all issues China, especially in the United States.  American Internet companies need to start communicating better now how they see this situation, why they feel it is justified to do business in China, why they will conform to local regulations, why this is not selling out American values, and under what circumstances they will reveal customer information or communications to governments. They need to do it before they are on the defensive in congressional hearings, when everything they say will be greeted with skepticism reserved for the proclamations of those already convicted in the press.

While they are communicating, US Internet companies need to be mindful that their audiences include the US government, their US customers, the Chinese government and Chinese customers and that public messages must be considered in that context. US Internet companies need to be prepared to act as rational advocates for China, aware of its problems while resisting attempts to demonize the country or oversimplify its situation. They need to understand China well enough to be able to explain its complexities to foreigners who might otherwise take a simplistic, emotionally charged view. They must be able to provide context for their decisions without condescending to their Chinese customers or to western stakeholders who have legitimate concerns about what their national business champions get up to abroad.

Most important, they need to remember that this is a situation driven by social values, and values have to figure in the communication, if even in explaining why they have to be applied differently in different times and places. The terse “obeying local regulations” reply is insufficient because it leaves the values part of the equation unaddressed. As long as that “values” hole in the communication is not filled by Internet companies, others, such as RSF or anti-China agitators in the US, will start filling it themselves.

This approach won’t stave off confrontation or debate about this issue, and nor should it. Part of believing in free speech is believing in the value of the debate. But it will put Internet companies in a better position to answer the accusations that will inevitably be flung their way as the rhetoric grows hotter.

Update: At the risk of creating a circular link, it’s worth reading Roland’s post on this issue at ESWN. His capsule intro: “If the subject is about Chinese Internet censorship, then this had better not be a decision made by the US Congress, Reporters Without Borders, Cisco, Yahoo, and Microsoft.  It would seem that you better ask the Chinese Internet users themselves.  I assert that they couldn’t care less about Yahoo but the loss of MSN Spaces would be a blow.”  Go check it out.

Also, Danwei’s metaphorical take.

Also, for balance, Daai Tou Laam Diary’s different take on this issue, including his deconstruction of my own arguments. Apparently I’ve made it to “arrogant China hand”, thus fulfilling one of my childhood ambitions. Not bad for only a year-and-half in China. Also in trackbacks, below.

Disclosure: Imagethief is a strong believer in freedom of speech and feels that censorship generally does far more harm than good in a society. I believe that China would benefit greatly from a more open and unfettered discourse, that the arbitrary jailing of journalists and activists is appalling and that universal human rights carry the label “universal” with some justification. My point behind writing this is not to disavow my own strong affinity for free speech or my anxieties about the complicity of American firms in practices I personally finds reprehensible, nor is it to be an apologist for the brutalities Chinese regime or for censorship. My point is to explain why I feel this is a much more complex and nuanced issue than it is generally made out to be and, thus, to illuminate some of the communication challenges and explain why current communication efforts are inadequate.

Imagethief does not represent any companies currently caught up in this issue. He does, however, represent other companies that do business with the Chinese government.

“Name a successful American Internet firm in China,” he said.
“Well,” I answered, “there’s always…er.” And I thought about a bit.
“What about…nah, they’re not doing so hot.” And I thought about it a bit more.

Ok, so there isn’t one. American Internet firms are, by and large, doing badly in China. The whys and wherefores of this could fill a few posts, but a few reasons come to mind:

• Arrogance
• Poor communication
• Lack of understanding of Chinese culture, reflected in interfaces, communication tools and services provided
• A preference for local products among Chinese Internet users

The large portals are, of course, media firms, and they have also been victimized by many of the same things that have bedeviled traditional media firms coming into China, such as a strict regulatory regime and a sense that the services offered here are sanitized versions of the real thing. While local Internet firms are subject to the same restrictions, they seem to be able to manage appearances better. I think this is in part because they benefit from the (correct) perception that they serve the Chinese audience first. Every time a foreign Internet firm gets involved in a censorship or other scandal, it reinforces that perception. Plus, a little “root for the home team” nationalism goes a long way in China.

Two bits of recent corporate communication illustrate the problems of foreign Internet firms in China, in different ways. The first is a statement issued by Yahoo! Hong Kong (not China) in response to the controversy over the turning over of Chinese journalist Shi Tao’s e-mail to the Chinese police, and his subsequent arrest. Here it is:

Yahoo! Hong Kong Statement
18 October 2005

As a company operating in the jurisdiction of the Hong Kong Special Administration Region, Yahoo! Hong Kong adheres to all applicable local laws and regulations in Hong Kong and our privacy policy. The Chinese authorities have never contacted Yahoo! Hong Kong to request any of its user information.  Yahoo! Hong Kong and Yahoo! China are managed and operated separately and independently of one another.  As such, Yahoo! Hong Kong and Yahoo! China have never exchanged or revealed respective user information to one another.

This is really interesting for several reasons. First, its an attempt by Yahoo! Hong Kong to distance itself from Yahoo! China. Now, checking the bottom of the Yahoo! China website will show you that Yahoo! China is also operated out of Hong Kong, by Yahoo! Holdings, Hong Kong. So it is, indeed, a different operating company from Yahoo! Hong Kong.

There are a couple of legitimate reasons why Yahoo! Hong Kong would want to do this. First, they were probably getting a lot of misdirected media inquiries and hate mail. Second, as they serve the uppity and more democratically minded Hong Kong audience, the may wish to distance themselves from something they find unpalatable.

Nevertheless, from an International PR point of view, this makes no difference. The damage done to Yahoo! by the Shi Tao affair was at the international brand level. Yahoo! Hong Kong, Yahoo! China, or Yahoo! Upper Volta, it doesn’t make any difference. Especially to the liberal minded Americans and Europeans who are still Yahoo!’s bread-and-butter customers. And the continued woes in that department can be seen in this recent, very interesting article from the International Herald Tribune. As previously predicted in this space, the “just following local laws” excuse is now coming under wider scrutiny:

Yahoo, meanwhile, gets to keep its piece of the gigantic China pie, insisting like most Western companies doing business there that it must abide by the laws of countries in which it operates.

“What if local law required Yahoo to cooperate in strictly separating the races?” asked Max Boot, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, in a widely circulated essay for The Los Angeles Times. “Or the rounding up and extermination of a certain race? Or the stoning of homosexuals?”

Jim Etchison, an information technology management consultant from Pomona, California, created BooYahoo, at booyahoo.blogspot.com, a site dedicated to urging “freedom-loving citizens of the Internet” to stop using Yahoo services “as a result of their oppressive policies.”

“I was a happy Yahoo user for about nine years and was so offended by the Shi Tao business that I boycotted them,” Etchison said in an e-mail message. “What begins in China will end where I live.”

Of course, nobody in China can see Jim’s site because it is on Blogspot and, therefore, blocked.

The Yahoo! Hong Kong statement is also interesting because it suggests that the legal obligations of Yahoo! Holdings, Hong Kong (operator of Yahoo! China) may be conflicted between Hong Kong’s privacy regulations and China’s demands for more-or-less complete fiat over all media firms operating within mainland borders or serving mainland audiences. But I am unschooled on such things, and this is just a wild hare.

The other interesting announcement was one from online auction juggernaut, eBay, in response to a zero-fee deal from pesky, Chinese competitor Taobao (part of Jack Ma’s Alibaba empire, recently sold to, whaddaya know, Yahoo!):

eBay (Nasdaq:EBAY)(www.ebay.com) today issued the following statement regarding Taobao’s pricing challenge:

“Free” is not a business model. It speaks volumes about the strength of eBay’s business in China that Taobao today announced that it is unable to charge for its products for the next three years.

We’re very proud that eBay is creating a sustainable business in China, while providing Chinese consumers and entrepreneurs with the safest, most professional, and most exciting global trading environment available today.

An interesting article in Red Herring looks at the competition between Taobao and eBay. It raises industry observers’ doubts about Taobao’s approach. But it also had this to say:

EachNet founder and Chairman Bo Shao once dismissed the Taobao approach, pronouncing, “Free is not a business model.” Free-at-first, however, does seem to have worked for Taobao’s parent company Alibaba, the business-to-business (B2B) portal Mr. Ma founded in 1999. Hangzhou-based Alibaba, which Mr. Ma claims is the largest global B2B site in the world, did not charge for its first three years, but Mr. Ma asserts that the company has been in the black since the third quarter of 2002. “We know the difference between investing money and burning it,” he says.

Jack Ma’s success in building Alibaba suggests that he has some idea what he is doing, so it will be interesting to watch how this unfolds. He also claims, in the Red Herring article, that Taobao can make money on advertising alone, although they plan to go to a fee model eventually. There is another issue with auction sites as well. Unlike a news site, the value of an auction site, and hence its power to attract and retain users, grows as the size of its community expands. The network effect creates a more interesting and liquid marketplace. So if you can afford to spend money to build a critical audience, why not? Indeed, as Red Herring points out, this tactic was used successfully against eBay in Japan already.

But beyond that, there is the tone of eBay’s press statement. This is the kind of thing that peaks a flack’s interest. If eBay’s plan was to project confidence, it failed. Instead, it projected defensiveness. I don’t think many people suspect that Taobao is “unable to charge”. I think most people suspect it simply doesn’t want to charge until it has to. And there is a strategic argument to be made for that. Free can be a business model…for a while. eBay could have found a more constructive way to make its argument.

If the ultimate test of a press statement is how journalists respond to it, this one didn’t pass muster. The journalist I was speaking to summed it up in one word:

“Snarky,” he said.

Note: Thanks to the journalist cited above for turning me on to both of these statements, and for talking through some of this with me.

It seems that American technology companies can’t stay out of trouble in China. The last two days has seen widespread coverage of Yahoo!’s alleged implication in the arrest of a Chinese journalist wanted for “releasing state secrets”, which is a euphemism for embarrassing the government, among other things. The BBC has one of the more interesting articles, because it covers the bigger picture without dwelling on the usual shopping list of scare figures, like the 40,000 lurking net monitors (cited in the Telegraph’s coverage – does anyone else notice that number inflating?):

Yaman Akdeniz is the director of cyber-rights.net, a web-based e-mail service set up in the wake of tighter laws in the UK about the traceability of e-mail communications.

He advises activists using the web in oppressive regimes around the world to make sure they did not set up accounts with firms which have offices in the country in question.

“Providers with offices in China have to obey specific rules. We operate in the UK so I don’t have to reply to any requests for information made by the Chinese government,” he said.

While cyber-rights.net collects no information about its users it is not a completely untraceable way of sending communications.

If asked by the UK government to supply information in a fraud or terrorist investigation it is likely its parent company Hushmail would comply, even though it is based in Canada and not bound by UK law, said Mr Akdeniz.

“But if the request was for information about the account of a journalist it is likely it would be more reluctant to comply,” he said.

I don’t know if Yahoo! is guilty or not, but, as a PR pro, and in the wake of recent scandals concerning the conduct of fellow tech firms Cisco, Google and Microsoft in China, something is clear: there should be a whole category of crisis public relations for tech firms named as complicit in Chinese government censorship or detainments.

It doesn’t make much difference to those firms’ business in China, of course. For one thing, not many people are likely to hear about it here. But I wonder if it will start impacting technology firms internationally. I think back to noisy, well-organized public campaigns against companies doing business in apartheid-era South Africa, or in Myanmar. So far, the calls against tech firms complicit in censorship (and now arrests) in China have been pretty scattered, and confined primarily to the digerati rather than to the great mass of customers. That might change.

So far, most of the firms confronted have given variations on the “we comply with the laws of our host country” explanation. This is accurate and understandable, but as a PR holding statement it doesn’t do much to diffuse the perception that western tech firms are knuckling under to a repressive government in search of massive bucks. Just the thing to put college students in a righteous snit. Yahoo! hasn’t issued a statement on this situation that I can find, which is also not a great idea because NGOs like Human Rights Wach and Reporters Without Borders are busy filling the silence.

I can see the dilemma for big, listed Internet companies. Their shareholders will punish them ruthlessly if they aren’t aggressively pursuing the Chinese market. But to do business in China, they have to submit to the Chinese government, in all it’s capriciousness. These are really media companies – the only foreign media companies allowed to do business here – with real influence over Chinese people and a commensurate level of scrutiny from the authorities. But none of them will dare foresake the market on principles, and that leaves them vulnerable to PR problems whether petty, as in the case of Microsoft’s banning of general words from it’s MSN China Spaces blogging site, or sinister, as in Yahoo!’s possible complicity in an arrest. It doesn’t seem that many of them have thought in advance about how to deal with these problems.

Sooner or later, these companies are going to have to come up with a better explanation than “just following the law of the land”, or they will end up on the wrong side of a really aggressive, negative PR campaign that will hurt a lot. For the life of me, I can’t think of what that explanation might be; give me some time to work on it. But public statements of principle on matters of free speech and protection of the rights of journalists might be a good start. These are media companies, after all. Manufacturing companies have been down this road with China sweatshops and sketchy contract manufacturers. They’ve had to submit to independent monitoring and create codes of conduct for their contractors. And they’ve been held to account, although not often enough. Could a similar situation arise for the media companies doing business here?

In the meantime, there is some good advice in the BBC article above. If you’re a Chinese journalist or dissident, perhaps you shouldn’t host your e-mail with a company doing business in China. Perhaps the Electronic Frontier Foundation, an advocacy group for online privacy and anonymity, would care to make some of its very good privacy information available in Chinese.

Of course, it would probably be blocked…

Update, Sept 9: And sure enough, Yahoo!’s defence is just as predicted above. From Reuters, via the Australian:

“Just like any other global company, Yahoo! must ensure that its local country sites must operate within the laws, regulations and customs of the country in which they are based,” Yahoo spokeswoman Mary Osako said in a statement emailed to Reuters by the company’s Hong Kong arm.

This is meeting the predicable response from Reporters Without Borders, who ask:

“Does the fact that this corporation operates under Chinese law free it from all ethical considerations? How far will it go to please Beijing?” it asked.

“It is one thing to turn a blind eye to the Chinese Government’s abuses and it is quite another thing to collaborate.”

People who read this site know my opinions on the Chinese government’s treatment of journalists and the media. But looking at this strictly from a PR point of view, I think Yahoo! and the other firms will find their “just following the law of the land” defence progressively less tenable. That is because the NGOs and activists targeting them are attacking the morality of the laws that these companies are claiming to comply with. Go back to the apartheid comparison, above. If a company had cited compliance with the law of South Africa in submitting to apartheid, how do you think activists of the era would have responded?

The explanation still needs to evolve. Expect more trouble ahead.

Update 2: Other interesting links (both via Peking Duck)
Angry Chinese Blogger translates the document that got Shi Tao busted. (Proxy link.)
ESWN dissents on condemnation of Yahoo, although I suspect he will be a voice in the wilderness.

The remaining wisps of my youthful idealism are largely responsible. I started using commercial online services in 1992, and I started building websites in 1994 when I was in grad school. The Internet’s promise as a publicly accessible and democratizing mass medium hypnotized me and dictated the course of my career, into the technology industry, to Singapore and then to China.

The story of the technology industry’s moral collapse before the gleam of Chinese gold is the story of my commercial coming-of-age. The reason why I am so disappointed by the concessions of Microsoft, Cisco, Google and other complicit companies is that these are the companies of my generation. In my naïve heart of hearts, I hoped they would be different. Different from the oil companies that we somehow naturally expect to do business with sordid governments and wallow in environmental depredation. Different from old industrial giants, the car makers and manufacturers that we linked with rust-belt smokestacks, layoffs and economic decline. Different from the defense companies that were happy to sell weapons to our despotic allies. Different from everything that had come before.

It didn’t help that I was deeply immersed in the utopian fit of the technology bubble. I was so steeped in the rhetoric of the unstoppable, transformative power of the Internet that I internalized those beliefs and carried them even after the once bright-eyed startups auctioned the last of their Italian furniture. But technology companies still do their best to keep these fantasies alive. To this day, they market to us in the lexicon of freedom and transformation.

Where do you want to go today? asked Microsoft, suggesting that it could be anywhere you want, and never hinting that they might choose to keep some destinations off limits. Any time, any place, any device, they said, but not any word, they neglected to add.

Do no evil, lectured Google. The first line of their mission statement: Google’s mission is to organize the world’s information and make it universally accessible and useful. Universally accessible. That’s a nice idea. I wonder if it would work, now that we know Dan Gilmore was wrong all those years ago.

Our culture drives us to set high standards for corporate integrity and to give back by using our resources for a positive global impact, says Cisco, in explaining their corporate citizenship. But some parts of the globe are impacted more positively than others.

As a spin-doctor for technology companies I have written words like these myself. I, above all people, should be cynical about them. But I always carried that core of idealism with me. The Internet would be different, I thought to myself, and the people who had founded technology companies, many of them from my cohort, would somehow bring a different set of values than business had previously known. These were the companies of my generation. I had forgotten the core of greed and shallowness that lurked behind the technology industry’s evangelical mask in the terrible years of 1999 and 2000, when we all piously awaited the digital Rapture.

It was foolish, of course. The system is what it is, and it exerts its own terrible, transformative power, even on the most noble of companies. I had ridden one of those companies myself, a once promising venture in Singapore that crumbled from the inside as we succumbed to our own avarice and desperately pushed numbers around to please investment bankers with fast smiles and empty eyes. In the end we were unemployed, poor and bitter, but wiser. Or so we thought.

Technology entrepreneurs told us they would transform the world, and they were right. It has been a miraculous decade, and I wouldn’t change what the Internet brings me, especially here in Beijing, so far from my friends and family. But when we heard “transform the world” we only saw the good implied in that statement. Any technology brings its dark side, and we have spent the last five years discovering the Internet’s teeth. A tool for opening minds can be a weapon for closing them, and the arms merchants can turn out to be people we thought we knew.

So we confront the uncomfortable question of how we expect American companies to represent “our” values. By this, I mean the noble American ideals that we casually throw around in conversation but which are so fiendishly tricky to nail down in practice: freedom, democracy, human rights. The same words that vanished from MSN Spaces in a cloud of dark irony. The depressing reality is that public corporations, as much as they have their place, generally make dismal ambassadors for these ideals. It’s not because they’re evil, or because they are run by bad people. They’re not. It’s simply that the incentives the system creates lead in a direction where idealism is hard pressed to follow. But that doesn’t make the disappointment less bitter.

Meanwhile, the Chinese will manage without our hand-wringing. They can use the proxies if they want, choose to avoid MSN Spaces, cheerfully internationalize despite the best efforts of the CCP. They’ll wrestle with the problems in their own way. They might discover that there are places besides the Internet where interesting ideas can flow more easily. And if the climate in the US was ever to change, we might someday discover the same thing.

And that’s why I am so sad, and why it doesn’t matter whether the Chinese themselves care about this or not. It wasn’t about China’s expectations. It was about my own. In the end I wasn’t angry because technology companies had betrayed China. I was angry because they sold out the promise that I fell in love with twelve years ago. They betrayed me.

Some notes:

Several recent events made me want to write this. The first is a tightening of control domestic websites and blogs by the Chinese government, most recently with the MII’s website registration act. This is part of a general trend that has also affected mainstream media. (Both of those links from the invaluable Danwei.org, and see also this good story from the UK’s Guardian via Howard French’s “A Glimpse of the World” blog.)

The second event is the renewed vigor of the Chinese government’s censorship of foreign blogging engines, with Typepad the most recent in a string of victims. The third is the outing of Microsoft’s entirely voluntary attempts to placate China’s censors in advance by preventing the use of the words “freedom”, “democracy” and “human rights” in the titles of posts in the China version of their Spaces blog engine. While the blocking of Typepad has been noticed mostly by bloggers themselves, Microsoft’s move was widely reported and generated scorn and outrage. (Wired; BBC; Financial Times, etc.) Rebecca MacKinnon has written a good piece on the overall situation for Yale Global, and it has been picked up by several newspapers. She’s also explored the Cisco situation in some depth.

The entire trend is part of a worrying regression by the Hu Jintao government (here analyzed by Philip Pan of the Washington Post), long suspected of a somewhat less progressive outlook than that of Jiang Zemin (and there’s an alarming statement). The combined effect has been to call scrutiny to the complicity of American technology companies in China’s strengthening censorship apparatus. We should keep that issue alive.